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HOME RULE
HOME RULE: CONVENTION CENTER REFERENDUM COMMISSION V
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and
Governmental Reorganization Act' in an attempt to bring the right of
"home rule" to the District of Columbia.2 Commentators have stated that
the Home Rule Act is rampant with "inconsistencies and vagaries."3 This
past year, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' en banc decision in
Convention Center Referendum Commission v. District of Columbia4 helped
to clarify this murky area even though the court was badly divided and
unable to set forth a majority opinion. The "narrow" issue in Convention
Center involved the scope of the electorate's power to compel an initiative
pursuant to Congress' 1977 amendments to the Home Rule Act5, and the
validity of the District of Columbia Council's subsequent implementing
legislation.' Perhaps even more important than the court's ultimate deci-
sion on this issue, however, was its detailed examination of the entire sys-
tem of separated powers established by the Home Rule Act.
This landmark case resulted from an ad hoc group's efforts to place an
initiative on the election ballot, pursuant to the Initiative, Referendum and
Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977,7 that proposed blockage of fur-
ther public funding of the Washington Convention Center. In approving
the Charter Amendments Act, Congress had provided for the right of initi-
ative and had instructed the District of Columbia Council to pass imple-
menting legislation by September 6, 1978.8 When that deadline passed
without any legislation being enacted, the Convention Center Referendum
1. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (codified in scattered sections of D.C. CODE ANN.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as the Home Rule Act].
2. See, e.g, 119 CONG. REC. H8708 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Diggs).
3. Newman & DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony.- The District of
Columbia Self-Government Act, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 537, 540 (1975).
4. 441 A.2d 889 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (Convention Center II).
5. Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-281 to 1-295 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Charter Amendments Act].
6. Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
1320 to 1-1326 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Initiative Procedures Act].
7. Charter Amendments Act, supra note 5.
8. Id. § 1-287. The Charter Amendments Act required that implementing legislation
be passed within 108 days of the March 10, 1978, effective date.
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Committee (CCRC) sued to have the Charter Amendments Act declared
self-executing in order to allow introduction of its initiative.' On February
28, 1979, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the Act was
not self-executing.' 0 However, this decision became moot when the Coun-
cil passed implementing legislation shortly thereafter." Meanwhile, the
public funding and construction of the convention center was continuing
unabated. 12
Upon passage of the implementing legislation, CCRC again submitted
its proposed initiative to the Board of Elections and Ethics."' The Board
again rejected the initiative, stating that it was an improper subject for the
electorate." The Board based its decision on the "Dixon Amendment" to
the Initiative Procedures Act, which bars any initiative that would "negate
or limit [a budget request act] of the Council."'" CCRC sued in Superior
Court, arguing that the Dixon Amendment was invalid because it abro-
gated rights granted to the electorate by the Charter Amendments Act. 16
CCRC argued that the Dixon Amendment was an ordinary legislative act
that could not repeal or substantially amend a Charter (i.e., constitutional)
provision.' The Superior Court rejected this argument and ruled that the
Dixon Amendment merely made explicit what was already implicit in the
Charter Amendments Act itself: the fact that an initiative could not be
used to block the expenditure of funds that have previously been appropri-
ated for a capital project.' 8
Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals subsequently af-
firmed the Superior Court's ruling,'9 it relied on a different theory. The
9. See Convention Center Referendum Comm'n v. Board of Elections and Ethics, 441
A.2d 871, 872-73 (D.C. 1979) (Convention Center I).
10. Convention Center I, 441 A.2d at 873.
11. The Initiative Procedures Act went into effect on June 7, 1979. See, Convention
Center I, 441 A.2d at 873.
12. See Convention Center II, 441 A.2d at 896.
13. Id at 894.
14. Id
15. Id at 884 n.6. The Dixon Amendment is now codified in D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
1320(k)(l)(G) (1981).
16. Convention Center I, 441 A.2d at 873.
17. Id The Charter Amendments are in the nature of constitutional provisions and
cannot be amended by ordinary legislation. Convention Center II, 441 A.2d at 915. The
District Charter may only be amended by passage of a Council Act that is ratified by a
majority of registered qualified voters in the District and then approved by concurrent reso-
lution of Congress. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-205 (1981).
18. See Convention Center I, 441 A.2d at 873. The Charter Amendments Act excepts
"laws appropriating funds" from the electorate's general power of initiative. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-281(a) (1981).
19. Convention Center 1, 441 A.2d at 872.
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majority invoked the well-established principle that the right of initiative is
only available with regard to legislative, rather than administrative or ex-
ecutive, matters.2" It reasoned that the right of initiative could not be any
broader than the Council's legislative power,21 and held that, once funds
had been appropriated for a project, the only remaining function was for
the Mayor to exercise his exclusive executive function to spend those
funds.22 Any other conclusion, would impermissibly interfere with the Dis-
trict of Columbia's system of separated powers established by the Home
Rule Act.23 Because the Council was without power to block the expendi-
ture of previously appropriated funds, the electorate was necessarily also
without this power.24 In dissent, Judge Gallagher agreed that the scope of
the initiative power was limited to proposing legislative matters, 25 but
strongly attacked the majority's conclusion that an attempt to reverse the
appropriation of funds was non-legislative.26 Judge Gallagher thought it
"elementary that what a legislature can legislate it can repeal. ' 27
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc in
order to rule on these "questions of exceptional importance concerning
both the legislative powers of the District of Columbia Council and the
related right of the electorate to adopt legislation by initiative.' 28 A di-
vided court affirmed the earlier panel opinion, holding that the CCRC
proposal was not a valid initiative,29 but the plurality disagreed with the
earlier opinion's reasoning. The plurality held that even though the initia-
tive proposed a legislative act that would be within the Council's power to
effectuate, it was nonetheless barred by the Charter Amendments Act ex-
ception that precludes initiatives for "laws appropriating funds."3 This
exception, according to the plurality, was merely made explicit by the later
Dixon Amendment to the Initiative Procedures Act. Thus, the Dixon
Amendment was valid because it did not repeal or substantially amend a
Charter provision.3' The en banc concurrence, consisting of the two mem-
20. Id at 874. For cases supporting this principle, see, e.g., Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky.
188, 192, 182 S.W.2d 336 (1944); Whitehead v. H and C Development Corp., 204 Va. 144,
129 S.E.2d 691 (1963).
21. Convention Center 1, 441 A.2d at 876.
22. Id at 879.
23. Id at 881.
24. Id.
25. Id at 883 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
26. Id
27. Id at 888.
28. Convention Center H, 441 A.2d at 892.
29. Id
30. Id See supra note 18.
31. Id at 914-15.
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bers of the original panel majority, adhered to the view that the initiative
could not go forward because it proposed an administrative, not a legisla-
tive, act.32 The four dissenters argued that District of Columbia citizens
had been deprived of their right to vote because of the view, implicit in the
plurality and concurrence, that initiatives should be restricted to the great-
est extent possible in order to minimize interference with the executive and
legislative branches of the District of Columbia government.33 The dissent
denounced this "undercurrent" in the two majority opinions by stating
that initiatives are designed to interfere with elected officials on specific
issues, and then heavily criticized the arguments put forward in both
opinions.34
Interestingly, it is the plurality and dissent rather than plurality and con-
currence, that finally set forth most of the operative law for the future. At
issue first was whether the CCRC initiative proposed a legislative matter.35
All nine judges agreed that the initiative power could not extend beyond
the legislative power vested in the Council.36 Nevertheless, only the two
concurring judges felt that the proposal would be outside the Council's
legislative power;37 both the plurality and dissent agreed that the proposal
was legislative in nature.3a
Resolution of this issue required close analysis of the Council's legisla-
tive powers under the Home Rule Act.39 When it passed the Home Rule
Act, Congress vested broad legislative power in the District of Columbia
Council in order to relieve itself of "the burden of legislating upon essen-
tially local District matters."' However, in order to avoid possible consti-
tutional problems,4 Congress retained a role in the legislative process by
32. Id at 921 (Newman, C.J., concurring).
33. Id at 922 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
34. Id at 922-23.
35. Id at 896.
36. Id at 892 (plurality), 920 (Newman, C.J., concurring)), 921 (Gallagher, J.,
dissenting).
37. Id at 921 (Newman, C.J., concurring).
38. Id at 892 (plurality), 921 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 903-11 (plurality).
40. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201 (1981). Thus, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, see
id § 1-233(a), the Council may legislate over "all rightful subjects of legislation within the
District .. "Id § 1-204. The Mayor may then veto the act, but the Council may overrule
this veto by two-thirds vote. Id § 1-227(e).
41. The United States Constitution provides that Congress has the power to exercise
"exclusive" legislation over the District. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Although the Supreme
Court has, on occasion, addressed this problem, its announcements have not always been
consistent, and commentators still differ over the amount of legislative authority Congress
may constitutionally delegate to the District of Columbia. See Newman & Depuy, supra
note 3, at 569-73.
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subjecting the Council's ordinary legislation to a thirty-day congressional
layover, during which time the legislation can be disapproved by a concur-
rent resolution of the House and Senate.42 District Budgetary Acts, how-
ever, received different treatment. After the Council passes a budget
request act, 3 the Mayor submits the request to the President' who, after
review by the Office of Management and Budget,45 submits the final ver-
sion to Congress.46 For the Council's budget request to be enacted into
law, Congress must approve it in the annual District of Columbia Appro-
priations Act.47 Thus, while most legislation passed by the Council re-
quires mere Congressional acquiescence, budget requests require Congress
to act affirmatively.
With those principles established, the Convention Center IIen banc plu-
rality examined the initiative to determine whether the proposed matter
would have been within the Council's power to enact.4" The plurality read
the initiative as an attempt to halt the convention center project by means
of both a substantive and fiscal strategy.49 The substantive strategy was to
repeal the authorization for the construction5° and operation"1 of the Con-
vention Center. 2 The fiscal strategy was to revoke any present appropria-
tions for the project and to prohibit the Council from making future
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c). Congress also reserved its power to legislate affirma-
tively for the District on any subject. Id § 206.
43. The Council passes budget request acts pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-304
(198 1). As with ordinary legislation, see supra note 40, the Mayor has veto power over all or
part of the budget request act, and the Council may override this veto by two-thirds vote.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227(f) (1981).
44. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-227(0, 47-304 (1981).
45. 31 U.S.C. §§ 2, 16, 26 (1976).
46. Id § 11(a).
47. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-53 (1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-304 (1981).
48. Convention Center 11, 441 A.2d at 899-902. The only CCRC initiative examined by
the plurality was the original one that attempted to halt the present and future funding of
the convention center, even though CCRC argued that its later initiatives relating only to
future funding of the convention center, should also be considered. See id at 900. However,
those later initiatives were submitted by CCRC without having obtained the approval of 5%
of the registered electors in each of five or more of the city's wards, as required by D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-282(a) (1981)). See 441 A.2d at 901. The plurality held that the proposer of
an initiative may not alter the terms of an initiative after the required popular support has
been governed. Id at 900-02. Neither the concurrence nor the dissent took issue with this
holding.
49. 441 A.2d at 899-900.
50. The general authorization for the construction of the convention center was said to
be found in D.C. CODE ANN. § 9-219(a) (1981). See 441 A.2d at 899.
51. The authority for the convention center's operation emanated from D.C. CODE
§§ 9-601 to 9-610 (1980 Supp.) (currently codified at same location). See 441 A.2d at 899.
52. See 441 A.2d at 899.
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budget requests.53
The plurality first considered whether the substantive act of revoking the
authorization for the construction and operation of the project would be
within the Council's power to effectuate, and concluded that the Council
could pass legislation to accomplish this end.5 4 However, the plurality
stated that the Council could only halt the expenditure of funds already
appropriated by Congress, by going through the more elaborate budgetary
process." In other words, it would not be enough to merely deauthorize a
project. Rather, the Council would have to submit the proposal to Con-
gress and get its approval on this supplemental budget request act to re-
scind appropriations for the deauthorized program.56 The court felt that it
would circumvent the requirement of affirmative congressional approval
for budgetary matters to allow the Council to deauthorize (by passing ordi-
nary legislation) a program previously funded by Congress.57 Thus, the
court concluded that the thirty-day congressional layover period for ordi-
nary legislation and the affirmative congressional approval required for
budget request acts were not functionally equivalent.58
As to the fiscal strategy embodied in the initiative, the court found that
the Council would have the authority to act in this area, as long as it
passed a supplemental budget request act.59 Furthermore, the plurality
held that the power to enact a supplemental budget request act is a legisla-
tive one.60 Stating that the passage of ordinary legislation is no less legisla-
tive because of the congressional layover requirement, the plurality
reasoned that a rescission of funding is a legislative act that merely hap-
pens to involve two legislatures: the Council and Congress.6' The dissent
explicitly agreed with the plurality's reasoning and conclusion that the pro-
posal encompassed in the initiative would be within the Council's power to
effectuate.62 Only the two concurring judges disagreed, concluding that the
initiative proposed a nonlegislative act.6 At this point in the court's analy-
53. See id
54. Id at 905-11.
55. Id at 906.
56. Id at 907.
57. Id
58. See id
59. Id at 910. Note that under this reasoning, it does not matter whether or not the
substantive authority for a previously funded project is repealed, because in either case, the
Council must pass a supplementary budget request act and obtain affirmative congressional
approval.
60. Id at 910.
61. Id
62. Id at 922 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
63. Id at 921 (Newman, C.J., concurring).
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sis, therefore, two judges had determined that the initiative was properly
withheld from the electorate, while the seven remaining judges were re-
quired to make the additional determination of whether there was any ex-
press or implied limitation on the general rule that the right of initiative is
coextensive with the legislature's authority.64
The plurality found two possible limitations on the electorate's right to
act by initiative. 65 First, the Charter Amendments Act precludes all initia-
tives for "law appropriating funds."66 Second, the Dixon Amendment to
the Initiative Procedures Act bars initiatives that would "negate or limit" a
budget request act.67 The plurality and dissent were in full accord that the
Dixon Amendment would, if given effect, block the proposed initiative be-
cause that initiative would plainly contravene an existing budget request
acL68 Furthermore, both the plurality and dissent agreed that the Dixon
Amendment was valid legislation only insofar as it conformed to the Char-
ter Amendments Act, which is in the nature of a constitutional provision
that cannot be amended by ordinary legislation.69 Thus, the decisive issue
was whether the exception in the Charter Amendment Act precluding ini-
tiatives proposing "laws appropriating funds" barred an initiative propos-
ing the "unappropriation" of funds.
In order to decide this issue, the plurality looked at the language of the
"laws appropriating funds" exception and concluded that it was ambigu-
ous.7" This ambiguity stemmed from three factors. First, the Council does
not pass "laws"; rather, it passes "acts" that become law only after con-
gressional layover (in the case of ordinary legislation) or affirmative con-
gressional approval (in the case of budgetary matters).7 ' Second, the
Council does not "appropriate" but instead, "requests" funds which Con-
gress may then appropriate.72 Finally, because there is no distinct "unap-
propriations" process (i.e., the Council would merely pass a supplemental
64. The principle that the power of the electorate to act by initiative is coextensive with
the legislature's power, in the absence of express or implied legislation, has been established
by cases such as Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950) (en banc);
Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash. 2d 349, 356, 474 P.2d 247, 251-52 (1970) (en banc). There ap-
peared to be unanimous agreement among the Convention Center II judges on this point.
See 441 A.2d at 897 (plurality), 920 (concurrence), 921 (dissent).
65. See 441 A.2d at 911.
66. See supra note 18.
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
68. See 441 A.2d at 914-15 (plurality), 929 (dissent).
69. See id at 914 (plurality), 924 (dissent). As to the exclusive procedure to amend the
Charter, see supra note 17.
70. 441 A.2d at 911.
71. Id. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
72. 441 A.2d at 911. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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budget request act seeking rescission of funding), the word "appropria-
tions" could refer to either a positive or negative act.7 3 Because the lan-
guage of the exception was facially ambiguous, the plurality looked
beyond it to the purpose of the exception." The plurality decided that
neither the Council nor Congress had considered, at the time the Charter
Amendments Act was passed, whether an attempt by the electorate to
block the expenditure of previously appropriated funds would fit within
the exception." Nevertheless, the plurality felt that the Act should be in-
terpreted to bar such an attempt because the legislative purpose was to
"prevent the electorate from interfering with accomplished fiscal acts of
the Council and/or Congress."76 Once the Charter Amendments Act had
been interpreted to bar the initiative, the Dixon Amendment (which on its
face clearly barred the initiative) must necessarily be mere surplusage;
77
had it any independent force, it would be an invalid attempt to amend the
Charter by ordinary legislation.78
The dissent vehemently criticized the plurality's interpretation of the
"laws appropriating funds" exception.79 It argued that this language
should be translated to mean "budget request acts." 8° Such an interpreta-
tion, according to the dissent, would have the effect of barring only those
initiatives actually proposing a budget request act.8 The dissent felt that
this interpretation would allow an initiative that sought to rescind (rather
than appropriate) funds to go to the electorate.82 Because the initiative was
not, therefore, barred by the Charter, the Dixon Amendment was necessar-
ily invalid insofar as it attempted to abrogate a basic Charter right.
8 3
Although the dissent's attempt to construe the initiative right liberally is
well-intended, its interpretation of the "laws appropriating funds" excep-
tion ultimately proves to be too broad. The dissent's argument that inter-
preting "laws appropriating funds" to mean "budget request acts" would
allow initiatives to halt, but not seek, funds might be persuasive had not
the dissent previously admitted that a budget request act must be passed in
73. 441 A.2d at 911.
74. Id at 911-13.
75. Id at 912.
76. Id at 913.
77. The plurality stated that the Dixon Amendment was "congruent" with the Charter.
Id at 915.
78. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
79. See 441 A.2d at 924-27, 930 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
80. Id at 924 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
81. Id
82. Id at 926-27 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 930 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
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both cases. 84 Thus, the plurality appears, on balance, to have the better
view. There is, however, at least one problem with the plurality's opinion.
If indeed the Dixon Amendment is mere surplusage to the Charter
Amendments Act, why did the Council ever pass it? It would seem that the
Council must have interpreted the Charter Amendments Act as allowing
an initiative, such as that proposed by the CCRC, which would "unap-
propriate" funds.
Overall, the plurality opinion is the most well-reasoned of the three. De-
spite rejecting CCRC's particular initiative, the plurality actually con-
strued the initiative right relatively broadly. More importantly, the
plurality abandoned the restrictive view of the earlier panel majority as to
what constitutes a "legislative act" within the power of the Council. Con-
trary to the dissent's criticisms, the plurality's opinion fully protects both
Home Rule and the electorate's general right of initiative.
Sean Connely
84. See id at 922 (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (agreeing with plurality's interpretation of
council's legislative powers).
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